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RISK, INSURANCE AND DEFAULT IN A RURAL CREDIT MARKET 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA 
Abstract 
This paper examines the role played by credit transactions in permitting 
households to cope with risk in an environment characterized by incomplete 
markets and imperfect information. Within small communities in northern 
Nigeria credit transactions play a direct role in pooling risk between 
households through the use of contracts which make owed repayments depend on 
the realization of random shocks by both borrowers and lenders. The aim of 
the paper is to consider the institutional and informational context_which 
permits state-contingent loan contracts to be made and enforced. The paper 
presents a model of a bilateral credit relationship which can accommodate a 
wide range of informational environments and which explicitly incorporates the 
contractual enforcement mechanisms available in these villages. The terms of 
the loan contract are negotiated with each household taking into account the 
fact that, depending on the realized state of nature, the other may default on 
its obligations. The structure of an econometric model is derived from the 
Nash bargaining solution. The results support the hypothesis that loan 
repayments include state-contingent payments that serve to pool risk between 
the borrower and the lender. The research is based on a year long survey in 
Zaria, Nigeria conducted by the author. 
Key Words: Rural Credit, Risk 
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Risk is a central fact of life in rural areas of less developed 
countries. There is a vast, mainly theoretical literature that explores its 
consequences for individual behavio~ and the evolution of institutions. 1 In 
the absence of complete insurance markets, households utilize a variety of 
economic strategies in order to mitigate the consequences of this risk. This 
paper uses a unique data set to analyze in some detail one institution that 
plays an important role in allowing households to cope with risk. 
Credit transactions take on a special role when insurance markets are 
incomplete by allowing households to smooth their consumption streams in the 
face of random income fluctuations. This observation, of course, is the basis 
of much of the literature on the intertemporal allocation of consumption 
(e.g., Zeldes [1989]). Eswaran and Kotwal (1989) provide an extension of this 
theoretical work to joint production and consumption decisions in agriculture 
in LDCs. Recently, empirical studies of credit markets LDCs have begun to 
take explicit account of intertemporal consumption-smoothing in the face of 
income shocks as a motivation for credit transactions (Rosenzweig [1990], 
Morduch [1990]). In northern Nigeria, the credit market seems to play a more 
direct role in households' risk management. In earlier work based on a survey 
in northern Nigeria (Udry [1990, 199la]), I argue that the repayment owed on a 
loan depends upon random production and consumption shocks received by both 
the borrower and the lender, permitting these households to insure each other 
directly against idiosyncratic risk. State-contingent loan contracting 
permits more efficient risk pooling between borrowers and lenders, and allows 
credit transactions in this Islamic region to conform to the prohibition of 
fixed interest lending by Shari'a law. 
1See Bardhan (1989) and Bell (1988) for references. 
2 
My goal in this paper is to consider these loan transactions in their 
institutional context, that is, to examine the personalized interaction 
between borrower .and lender in the ·setting of a village economy. The result 
is a structural econometric model of the determinants of net borrowing or 
lending, the repayment owed by the borrower (including, inter alia any state­
contingent adjustment of this quantity), and the decision by the borrower as 
to whether to default on his obligations. 2 I am able to establish exclusion 
restrictions which permit the decision to default on a loan and the 
determination of the state-contingent amount owed on a loan to be identified 
separately. Furthermore, I am able to consider the actual contractual 
mechanisms through which the repayments owed on a loan are made state­
contingent. 
I am able to shed light on these details by excluding from consideration 
the general equilibrium properties of state-contingent loan contracting, which 
are the focus of Udry (1991a). There are only three actors in this paper. 
Two are households which may transact credit. One of these two is called "the 
household" or "the sample household"; the other is "the transaction partner," 
or "the partner." The final actor has no independent motivation and would in 
other contexts be called the court system. Here it is the community or family 
authority concerned with monitoring and enforcing contracts. 
In section A I provide some background information concerning credit 
transactions in northern Nigeria and describe the physical and information 
environment faced by the household and its transaction partner. I describe 
the contractual form of the loan transactions and the community-based 
2There have been relatively few attempts to estimate structural models of 
informal credit transactions in developing countries. See Iqbal (1981),
Kochar (1991), and Bell, Srinivasan and Udry (1991). 
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mechanisms which serve to enforce the contracts in section B. These 
observations serve as the basis for the model of a bilateral credit 
relationship with state-contingent repayments which is introduced in the same 
section. 
Enforcement of these credit contracts is not perfect; 10 percent of all 
loans are defaulted by the borrower. 3 Section C, therefore, is devoted to 
the decision by the borrower as to whether to default on his repayment 
obligations. In section DI derive the indirect expected utility of the 
household and its transaction partner as a function of the contractual terms 
of the loan. In section E, I describe the equilibrium loan size and repayment 
using the natural symmetrical Nash bargaining solution. In order to account 
for the one-fifth of sample households which do not participate on either side 
of the credit market, the possibility of transactions costs is introduced in 
this section. This study is based on a survey of 196 households in four 
northern Nigerian villages. I provide a brief description of the study area 
and survey methodology in section F, along with a discussion of the variables 
used in the analysis. In section G, I develop an econometric specification 
based on the bargaining solution to the bilateral model. Estimation results 
are presented in section H. The most important finding is that state­
contingent payments are embedded in the loan repayments, and that these 
payments serve to pool risk between the borrower and the lender. 
A. Risk and Information Flow within the Village. 
The four villages are small (an average of 366 resident households) but 
not isolated. Three quarters of the households produce vegetables and non­
food cash crops for the market, over half of the labor used on farms is hired, 
3The definition of a defaulted loan is described in section F. 
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and virtually all land is treated with modern chemical fertilizer. All of the 
sample households name farming as their primary occupation. 
Loans in these villages are quite informal. They are made without 
witnesses or written records. Although the borrower and lender negotiate over 
the size of the loan, explicit interest rates or repayment dates are almost 
never set. The loans are made between individuals who are well-known to each 
other and who share a great deal of information about each others' farming 
activities and household events; neither formal sector lending institutions 
nor specialized private moneylenders participate in the credit market. 97 
percent of loans (weighted by value) are between neighbors or between 
relatives. For 82 percent of loans, survey participants were able to provide 
an accounting of activities on the farms of those from whom they borrowed, or 
to whom they lent (Udry [1990, p. 259]). Common institutional adaptations to 
information asymmetries are not found in this credit market. There is no 
evidence of contractual interlinkages involving loans, and only 3 percent of 
loans (by value) are backed by collateral (Udry [1990, section III]). 4 
The free flow of information within these rural communities facilitates 
the practice of implicitly embedding insurance contracts within loan 
transactions. The survey data show that realized rates of return are lower 
and repayment periods are longer for debtor households which have received 
adverse shocks (table 1). This observation is consistent with standard credit 
contracts because debtors who receive adverse shocks are more likely to 
default. There is also evidence, however, that repayments respond to the 
40n the role of collateral and contractual interlinkages in credit 
transactions subject to moral hazard or adverse selection, see Chan and Thakor 
(1987), Bell (1988), Stiglitz and Weiss (1986), and Rogerson (1985). See Udry 
(1991b, chapter 2) for more a complete set of references. 
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circumstances of the lending household (table 1). This finding is not 
consistent with conventional models of loan contracting, nor with credit 
contracts in the .form of equity investments by the lender in the borrower's 
activities. 5 Rather, these loans appear to be true risk pooling arrangements 
between the two households. 
The existence of these state-contingent contracts raises the possibility 
that the allocation of resources might approximate that which would be 
achieved with complete competitive markets. A number of studies have recently 
explored this possibility in other contexts (Altonji and Hayashi [1991]; 
Cochrane [1989]; Lim [1990]; Mace [1989]; Townsend [1991]), but in Udry 
(1991a) I test and reject the hypothesis that a Pareto Efficient allocation is 
achieved in these villages through these loan transactions. 
Given that Pareto Efficiency is not achieved through these loan 
transactions, their institutional structure and the information environment in 
which they occur become germane. While it appears that information moves 
between borrowers and lenders in these villages more freely than is permitted 
in much of the theoretical literature, the ten percent default rate on loans 
implies that the possibility of some degree of information asymmetry must be 
investigated. When the promised transfer of future resources is not certain, 
the character of a loan is influenced by the risks faced by the parties 
involved, by their knowledge of each other and of their activities, and by the 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms associated with the loan transaction. 
In this section, I make assumptions concerning the economic and 
institutional environment within which the loan transactions occur. Consider 
5Equity investments are a common mechanism for avoiding the prohibition 
by Shari'a law on fixed interest charges. See Iqbal and Abbas (1987). 
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h
a village in which two agents ("the household" and "the partner") interact. 
The model permits two sources of random variation in income; one source is 
publicly observed by the entire community (and will be referred to as the 
observable shock), the other is private knowledge to the recipient (and will 
be referred to as the unobservable shock). There are two periods, with S 
observable "states of nature" in the second period indexed bys, each with 
objective and commonly known probability of occurrence ~s. Both agents and 
the village community at large observe the realization of the state in the 
second period. There is only one good, of which the household receives an 
income Ya in the opening period, while the partner receives Ya. In the next 
period they receive random observable incomes of ys and Y5 , which vary across 
the states of nature. This variation in income across the S states of nature 
is referred to as the observable shock. In addition to the observable income 
shock, the household and its partner respectively are subject to additional 
unobservable income shocks€ and~. distributed continuously with densities 
5 (€) and p 5 (~), so that their total incomes are Y5 +€ and Y5 +~, respectively. 
Given the state of nature, €and~ are distributed independently. However, 
the densities are permitted to vary across states, so€ and~ may include 
unobserved village level shocks. The supports of h 5 (€) and p5 (~) are such 
that ys + € > 0 and ys + ~ > 0 for all€ and~ such that h 5 (e) > 0 and p5 (~) > 
0. The realization of€ is observed only by the household, and only the 
partner observes the realization of~-
The model therefore permits two sources of variability in a household's 
income which differ according to their visibility to the rest of the 
community. A wide range of informational environments, from the complete 
information of Udry (1991) to drastic information asymmetry, can be 
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accommodated within the model. If information concerning farming activities 
and outcomes flows freely through the village, so that all income shocks are 
observable, then.the variances of g5 (€) and f 5 (~) are zero. On the other 
hand, if information concerning all income shocks is private, then Y5=Y and 
Y5 =Y for alls. 
B. A Bilateral Credit Relationship with State-Contingent Payments. 
The household and its partner may make loan contracts with each other. 
The loans are advanced in the initial period and repaid in the final period. 
The contracts are state-contingent in the sense that the repayments owed by 
the borrower may vary with the realization of the state of nature in the final 
period. The environment outlined above provides two motivations for state­
contingent credit transactions by risk averse agents. The first is to even 
out expected consumption across the two periods. If yo is below E(Y5+€), for 
instance, the household may wish to borrow to increase initial period 
consumption. Second, both agents may wish to engage in a credit transaction 
in order to reduce the variance of second period consumption through access to 
any state-contingent payments that flow toward an agent who has received an 
adverse realization of a second period income shock. 
There are two institutional considerations that are of particular 
importance to the econometric investigation which follows. The first is the 
precise manner in which the loan contracts are made state-contingent. The 
second is the mechanism which is used to enforce repayment of loan 
obligations. I will root the discussion of both of these issues in an 
analysis of the role of the community, taking as a central fact the finding 
that virtually all loans are transacted between residents of the same village, 
or between relatives. 
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A standard method of modeling contract enforcement is to consider the 
transaction as one instance of a repeated interaction. 6 A default may then 
be prevented by threatening the potential defaulter with exclusion from future 
transactions. Such a self-enforcing contract would flow naturally from a 
repetition of the bilateral relationship modeled here. This repeated game 
approach to modeling contract enforcement, however, is inappropriate in this 
setting. The credit transactions in these villages are not repeated. 82 
percent of loans occur between households which have never before engaged in a 
loan transaction with each other. These contracts do not need to be self-
enforcing because direct penalties can be imposed on defaulters. Both 
borrower and lender are members of the same community, therefore penalties for 
default can be imposed by an authority of the community. These penalties are 
not explicitly codified as law, but they operate in much the same way. The 
particular enforcement mechanisms are discussed in detail in Udry (1990); for 
the purposes of this discussion it is sufficient to summarize some of the main 
points. First, enforcement is carried out by village authorities or senior 
members of the families involved in a dispute. The enforcing authority has 
access to the free flow of information within the village regarding farming 
activities and outcomes (that is, the authority also knows the realization of 
the observable shocks). In order to reach a judgement as to whether a default 
has occurred, therefore, he must know the (unwritten) contractual terms of the 
loan including the state-contingent adjustments in owed repayments. Second, 
an important component of the penalties that are imposed by these authorities 
is a direct utility cost to the defaulter (in the form of admonishment or 
6Recent applications of the theory of self-enforcing insurance can be 
found in Thomas and Worrall (1988), Coate and Ravallion (1989), and Kletzer 
and Wright (1991). 
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public embarrassment). The penalties available to the authority are 
graduated, with more severe penalties imposed for more serious offenses. 
The mechanism available to enforce contracts limits the domain of 
outcomes over which repayments may be made contingent. Owed repayments cannot 
be made contingent upon the realization of the unobservable shocks for~. as 
no incentive compatible mechanism exists which could induce a household to 
reveal its true unobservable shock. 7 Therefore, I introduce state-contingent 
contracting into the model by allowing owed repayments to vary across the S 
observable states of nature. 
The model accommodates two alternative interpretations of the manner in 
which owed repayments are made contingent upon the realization of observable 
shocks to the incomes of the borrower and lender. First, the two households 
might negotiate over state-contingent adjustments in owed repayments. The 
household and its partner would then be negotiating over S+l contractual 
terms: the net amount lent by the household to the partner (which may be 
negative) and the Sowed repayments, which vary according to the observable 
shocks received by the two households. Alternatively, in accordance with the 
observation that the loans are made with very little negotiation, there are 
exogenous community standards that dictate appropriate payments contingent 
upon the realization of particular states. 8 If the later assumption is 
correct, the task faced by the enforcement authority is eased. He knows both 
the realized state of nature and the required adjustment in owed repayments; 
7It will be seen in section C that the possibility of default (and the 
associated penalties) introduces an incentive compatible mechanism for 
adjusting actual (as opposed to owed) repayments to realizations of the 
unobservable shocks. 
8These standards must change over time (with, for example, technology) 
but an exploration of this process is left for future work. 
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in order to make a judgement as to whether a default has occurred, he needs to 
learn only the size of the loan and the agreed-upon base repayment. In this 
interpretation, the state-contingent adjustments to owed repayments are 
exogenous to the contracting parties; the decision to adhere to the community 
norms that dictate these adjustments, however, is endogenous through the 
default decision. A test between these alternative hypotheses is presented in 
section H. 
If the terms of the contract, the costs of default, and both households' 
utility functions are common knowledge, then the cause of a default must lie 
in an income shock that raises the utility cost of repayment beyond that 
expected by the lender. The unobservable shocks€ and~. on which no 
contingent payments are based, provide the variation in income that could lead 
some households to default on their obligations. 
The time sequence of events is as follows: the household and its 
potential transaction partner have completed harvesting and have received 
incomes Y0 and Y0 from last season's production. Based on these incomes they 
negotiate over a loan, to be repaid after the following harvest. They have 
the freedom to bargain over the direction and size of the loan and over the 
amount to be repaid. They also may bargain over state-contingent adjustments 
in owed repayments. Alternatively, they share as common knowledge the 
community standards that require adjustments to the amount owed depending on 
the realized (observed) state of natures in the final period. Both parties 
realize that there are two sources of variance in next period incomes. There 
are observable income shocks across the S states of nature for which some 
adjustment in owed repayments may be made. The second source of income 
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variation is the unobservable shock (e and~) for which no additional 
adjustment in owed repayments is made. 
A deal is made and the loan is transacted. At harvest, both discover 
the realized observable shocks to each of their incomes (represented by the 
state of nature) and their individual unobservable shock e or~- The 
repayment that is owed is calculated based upon the agreed upon terms (or on 
the community dictated adjustments) according to the realized observable 
shocks to income. The party who owes the other, taking into account its total 
income including the unobservable shock~ ore, now decides whether to 
default. Community authorities then impose penalties on any defaulter. 
The notation shall be as follows. Let L be the amount lent by the 
household to its partner (if negative, the household is borrowing). The 
amount owed is determined by the agreed base repayment Rand by the negotiated 
or community-determined adjustment in the amount owed as a result of the 
observable shocks to both households' incomes. Denote this adjustment if it 
exists as Rs, the payment contingent upon the realization of the observable 
shocks defined bys. This payment is embedded in the loan contract and is 
made simultaneously with the repayment of the loan. This state-contingent 
payment may be positive or negative. The main hypothesis to be tested in the 
empirical work of this paper is that the state-contingent payment is positive 
when the realized observable states is in some sense (to be defined below) 
adverse to the household, and negative when the realized state is adverse to 
the partner. Thus OWED5 =R+Rs is the amount owed by the partner to the 
household if states occurs in the final period. The definition of the levels 
of Rand Rs is arbitrary (any two levels of R can be made equivalent by adding 
a constant to all R5 ). If the households negotiate over the state-contingent 
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adjustments Rs, then without loss of generality set R1-O. Thus R+R1-R is the 
amount owed if state 1 is realized. Alternatively, if Rs is determined 
outside the model by community norms, this ties down R. If OWEDs is negative, 
then the household owes a payment to the partner. 
The budget constraints faced by the household and its transaction 
partner can now be defined. Consumption by the household (partner) in period 
zero is Co = Yo-L (co = Yo+L). Let Cs,e,,, (cs,e,,,) denote consumption by the 
household (partner) in states of the final period when unobservable shocks€ 
and~ are received. In the final period, the budget constraints are: 
s s 
yHousehold: C + € + OWED 
S,€,~ 
-s s 
yPartner: C + ~ - OWED 
S,€,~ 
when there is no default, or if the debtor defaults: 
s 




s' € '~ 
Both parties receive utility from consumption in the two periods. 
will model the cost of defaulting as a direct reduction in utility in the 
final period C(DEFs,e, 11 ) where DEFs,e,,, = IOWED5 1 if the debtor defaults, and 
zero otherwise. The form of this function is discussed in section C. The 
separable Van Neuman-Morgenstern utility of the household is 
Partner: C + ~ 
1. EU= U(co) + fi \ ~s [ [[u(c ) - C(DEFS,€,~)] hs(€) ps(~) 0€0~.L CX) S,€,~CX) 
s 





U() and V() are both increasing, strictly concave, bounded from above, and 
twice continuously differentiable. Also assume that as x➔ o+, U(x) ➔-~. The 
dependence of DEFs,e,,, and DEFs,e,,, on the realized state of nature and on € and 
~ must now be described. 9 
C. The Default Decision. 
Approximately ten percent of all loans are defaulted, therefore the 
possibility of default is an important element on the model. It will be seen 
that the possibility of default and the associated enforcement technology 
provides an incentive compatible mechanism which permits some adjustment in 
repayments in response to the realization of unobservable shocks to income. 
In this section I will explore the decision of the partner to default. I 
focus on the partner's decision because the partner may choose to default when 
OWED5 >0. The exposition will be clarified somewhat by working with positive 
quantities. There is a utility cost to default C(DEF), which depends upon 
the amount defaulted. Assume that C(O)=O, that for DEF>O C(DEF) is 
continuous and continuously twice differentiable with C'()>O, C"()<O, that C() 
is bounded from above, and that as x➔ o+, C(x) ➔k, k>O. There is a fixed cost 
to even a small default, and the cost of defaulting rises at a decreasing rate 
with the size of the default. The d.efault decision is made after the 
realization of the observable state of natures and the unobservable income 
shocks (~and€). 
The decision to default is characterized in the appendix. The fixed 
cost associated with defaulting implies that in any observable states, given 
9The assumption that the utility cost of default is additively separable 
is made for simplicity. The analysis of the decision to default is not 
affected if the cost of default is modeled more generally as U(cs,e,,,,DEF5 •e·"). 
Full details are available from the author. 
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an unobservable total income ¥s h t lt ·f d 1 ·f th+~, t e par ner wi. 11 de f au i an on y i e 
amount owed OWEDs is larger than a certain critical size. I show that when 
the partner owes some obligation, it will choose to default if and only if it 
receives a "bad" enough unobservable shock to its income. In any states, for 
any level of repayments OWEDs, define ~s(OWEDs) as the value of the 
unobservable shock~ such that the partner will choose not to default for all 
~>~s(OWEDs) and will default for all ~~~s(OWEDs). If there is a bad enough 
unobservable shock to the borrower's income he will repay nothing, thus 
partially smoothing the unobservable shock to his income. The default penalty 
ensures that the borrower makes his owed repayment if the unobservable shock 
to his income is not too severe. 
~s(OWEDs) is a continuous and continuously differentiable increasing 
function of OWEDs. It is also, therefore, a differentiable function for all 
values of Rand Rs. For all values of R, Rs and observable states of natures 
such that the partner owes no repayment there is no possibility that the 
partner will default. In this instance, ~s(OWEDs) is defined so that 
p(~ 5 (L,R))=P(~ 5 (L,R))=O so the probability of the partner defaulting is 
correctly evaluated at zero (P(~) is the distribution function corresponding 
top(~)). Similarly, €s(OWED5 ) (a C2 decreasing function of OWEDs) can be 
defined. €5 (0WED5 ) is the critical value of€, below which the household will 
choose some level of default and above which the household will not default. 
Neither party will chose to default unless it receives a bad unobservable 
shock to its income. As the repayment owed by a party increases, less of a 
bad unobservable shock is required to induce it to default. €5 (0WED5 ) and 
€5~s(OWEDs) are abbreviated to and ~s below. 
15 
D. Household Preferences over Contract Terms. 
The indirect expected utility of the household is then 
3. EU= U(yo-L) + p~ 1ti{:u( Y 8 +R+R 8 +e) x (l-P 8 (11 8 ) ) h s (e) de 
+Je:J_~u(Y 5 +e) h 5 (e)p 5 (1l) dT)de + f_e~ [U(Y5 +e) -C( l OWED 8 1)] h 8 (e) de] 
The first integration is over those values of the unobservable shock€ 
for which the household does not choose to default in states. The integrand 
is the utility in the case of no default multiplied by the probability that 
the partner does not default in states. 
that P
The second integration is over those values of€ for which the household 
does not choose to default and those values of~ for which the partner does 




) > 0) then the integration is over the entire support of€ because 
it is impossible for both the household and its partner to have a positive 
probability of defaulting in the same state. That is, if OWED5 <0, then the 
partner will never default (P8 (~ 8 )=0) and this term will be zero. If OWED5 >0 
then the household will never default, H8 (€ 8 )=0 and the integration is over 
the entire support of€, The integrand is the utility in the case of the 
partner defaulting. 
The final integration is over the values of€ for which the household 
wants to default. Therefore, the utility cost of a default is included in 
this integrand. It should be noted that the expected utility function depends 
on the partner with whom the household is transacting. 
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The indirect indifference map in (L,R)-space associated with this 
utility function is drawn below (Fig. 1). The S state-contingent payments Rs 
are held fixed in figure 1. Recall° that if the two households negotiate over 
the state-contingent payments the normalization R1=0 is adopted. 10 Of course 
a similar map can be drawn for the partner. The critical feature of the 
diagram is the indifference curve 1°, corresponding to the level of utility 
that the household would achieve in autarky. Note that this indifference 
curve passes below the origin, reflecting the insurance benefit of access to 
the state-contingent payments Rs. It should also be noted that like all of 
the other indifference curves, r0 is not continuous; it has a hole at (O,R0) 
and includes the origin itself. The distance L0-o is the amount the household 
would be willing to pay in the first period for access to the state-contingent 
payments Rs in the second period (the "insurance premium"). The distance O­
R0, of course, is the amount the household would be willing to pay in the 
second period for access to Rs. It is easy to show that in the vicinity of 
(L0,0) (with the probability of default equal to zero), the indifference curve 
1° is upward-sloping and strictly convex. For large enough positive values of 
R, default by the partner becomes virtually certain and 1° asymptotes to the 
vertical line through (L0,0). 
E. Equilibrium. 
A variety of equilibrium concepts might be employed. For instance, the 
lender might choose optimally the contractual terms subject to keeping the 
borrower at or above a reservation utility. This approach, however, implies 
too much asymmetry between the borrower and lender, for this is a market in 
10In this case, a map similar to figure 1 can be drawn in any (L,R5 )­
space for 2:s;s:s;s. 
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which households frequently switch between borrowing and lending over time. 
Instead, I adopt the symmetric Nash bargaining solution, with threat points 
being no transaction, as the natural equilibrium concept. The choice between 
these alternative approaches to equilibrium has little effect on the structure 
of the econometric model to follow. The choice does have implications, 
however, for certain coefficients, and in section H this will serve as the 
basis of an informal test between the alternative equilibria. 
I allow for the possibility that there may be transaction costs to 
engaging in this loan contract. Transaction costs could emerge, for instance, 
if some effort is required to observe the states (and therefore to know the 
contingent payments that are owed). Assume that this cost is a lump sum 
utility cost; this is equivalent to adding a constant to the utility at each 
party's threat point. 
Let EU(L,R) be the expected utility to the household from a deal 
involving a loan of L to the partner, with agreed upon repayments R by the 
partner to the household, where Risa scaler if we interpret the state­
contingent payments as set by community norms. In this case, R=R in equation 
3. If we adopt the alternative interpretation that the households negotiate 
the state-contingent payments, then R is an S-dimensional vector. R1=0 is our 
arbitrary normalization. In this case, the households negotiate over a base 
repayment R (which is owed regardless of the realization of the state) and 
R5over for 2~s~S. Let EV(L,R) be the expected utility to the partner of the 
same deal. The symmetric Nash bargaining solution can be characterized by 
finding 
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4. Arg Max r • [EU(L,R) - U(Yo) - P~~SJoou(Ys:E)gs(E)dE 
L,R 
X [EV(L,R) - V(Yo) -P~~s[V(Ys+~)fs(~)d~ -
where Tis the transaction cost. The equilibriwn is pictured in figure 2. The 
household's indifference curves are solid; those of the partner are dashed. 
The core is the set of tangencies between the two indifference maps for which 
the expected utilities achieved by each party (inclusive of transaction costs) 
are greater than the expected ut~lity they achieve at the threat point. The 
bargaining solution is in the core at, say, point 1. 
Some comparative statics have been calculated given that the second 
order conditions are met at equilibriwn. Ceteris paribus, an increase in 
first period income increases lending (reduces borrowing). Increased first 
period income improves the terms at which a household transacts the loan; 
oR/oY0 > 0. The signs of the derivatives can be understood with reference to 
figure 3. Here the household is again the lender. An increase in yo will 
shift its entire indifference map down and to the right (it is better off at 
any (L,R)) and the slope of the new 1° is smaller at the x-axis (the household 
is willing to lend more at a parametric R). Equilibriwn will shift from point 
1 to point 2, with a larger loan and higher repayment. 
I undertook a survey of 200 households in 4 villages near the city of 
Zaria from February 1988 to February 1989. The survey consisted of monthly 
interviews with each of the household heads and (separately) his wives. The 
questionnaires were designed to yield a complete picture of each household's 
asset and debt position; an account of its credit, labor, product, asset, and 
asset-rental transactions over the previous month; and a range of demographic 
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and background data. For details on the study area and survey methodology, 
see Udry (1990, 1991b). Table 2 lists the variables used in this study. 
Net Lending, Repayments, and Defaults - The dependent variables are 
calculated from data on all loans taken or extended by a sample household for 
a single main cropping period. 11 The loans included in this analysis are 
those initially extended during the period from the harvest before the survey 
began until the middle of the main cropping season during the survey year 
(September). By September, early crops have been harvested and some loan 
repayments begin. Net lending by household i (Li) is the nominal value of 
loans extended minus loans taken during this period, while net repayments REP1 
is the net nominal value of repayments received by the household on those 
loans until the end of the survey in February. Repayments, therefore, are 
measured as actual ex post transfers, not as ex ante contractual agreements. 
There is no correction for price level changes over this period. The rare 
transaction made in kind is valued at the market price of the item at the time 
of the transaction. It should be noted that this bilateral model allows for 
only a single transaction partner for each of the sample households. Each of 
the sample households, however, has an average of two and one half transaction 
partners in the credit market. I will assume that the loan "partners" of each 
of the sample households acts as a consortium, the members of which are fixed 
exogenously. The "partners" negotiate as one against the sample household. 
This study also requires an indicator of which loans have been 
defaulted. The fact that no repayments have been made on a loan is not a 
sufficient indicator that the loan has been defaulted. R + R5 may equal zero 
11In this semi-arid environment there is only one rain-fed crop per year, 
with planting beginning in May. 
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in states of nature in which the borrower receives an adverse observable 
shock. Therefore, a loan is considered to be in default only if no repayments 
have been made and there is another indication that the borrower has not met 
his obligations. This supplementary indicator is based on the response to a 
question concerning the willingness of a lender to make loans in the future to 
the borrower. If the respondent was the lender, the respondent was asked 
about his or her willingness to make a loan in the future to this borrower. 
If the answer was no and the respondent expected to receive no future payments 
on the loan from the borrowing household, then the loan was judged to be in 
default and DEFAULT was set equal to one. If the respondent was the borrower, 
the respondent was asked about the lender's willingness to make a loan to 
respondent in the future. If the response was negative and the respondent 
expected to make no further payments on the loan, the loan was judged in 
default and DEFAULT was set equal to one. 
This is not an entirely satisfactory indicator that a default has 
occurred. Most importantly, it includes no information concerning the 
triggering of any enforcement mechanisms, for instance an appeal by the lender 
to the borrower's senior relatives or to village authorities concerning 
repayment of the loan. Unfortunately, I collected no such information during 
the survey. As long as at least temporary exclusion from future access to 
credit from the lender is a component of the penalty for default, then the 
present indicator captures all defaulted loans. However, as there may be 
other reasons for excluding a particular borrower from future access to 
credit, this indicator may overstate the prevalence of default. On the other 
hand, this indicator of default errs on the conservative side in its treatment 
of the timing of repayments. No loan is considered in default as long as the 
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respondent expects that further payments will be made. This is equivalent to 
assuming that the period of loans is open; as long as they are eventually 
repaid, no default has occurred. If there are misclassification errors 
concerning which households have defaulted, then the likelihood function is 
incorrect and the estimates will be inconsistent. 12 
This measure indicates that overall, 10.3 percent of loans are 
defaulted. Respondents who were lenders reported that 8.0 percent of the 
loans that they extended were defaulted. Respondents who were borrowers 
admitted that they defaulted on 14.4 percent of the loans that they had taken. 
This rather surprising difference in responses (in which borrowers admit to 
more defaults than lenders claim) is not statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. 
Observable Shocks to Income - The observable state of natures is 
defined by the realization of observable shocks to the incomes of the 
household and its transaction partner. I have two indicators of the realized 
observable shock to a sample household's income. They are based on self­
reported unexpected adverse events on the sample household's uplands and 
lowlands farms. The indices are weighted averages of these negative events 
(examples: flooding, lodging, animal invasions) on each plot and the weights 
are the relative sizes of each plot. The indices are broken down by upland 
and lowland plots because the two types of land are characterized by different 
farming systems. Upland plots are entirely rainfed and are farmed once a year 
12See Lee and Porter (1984) for a discussion of the effect of 
misclassification in an exogenous switching regression model. Freeman (1984) 
discusses the impact of similar misclassification in binary choice models. 
Stapleton and Young (1984) provide a cautionary note concerning measurement 
error affecting the dependent variable in a Tobit model (but not causing 
misclassification as censored or uncensored). 
22 
during the rainy season. On the lowland (fadama) plots there is dry season 
irrigated farming. Yh is the vector of these two indicators of the observable 
shock to a sample household's income. YP is the measure of the observable 
shock to the income of the transaction partner. This variable is the 
proportion of the total value of loans of the sample household which was 
transacted with partners who received an adverse shock between the time the 
loan was made and when it was repaid. All three of these indices are 
identical to those used in table 1. 
The use of these indices depends upon the assumption that the events 
used in their construction are observable to the village community (including 
the household, its partner, and family and village authorities) and are 
exogenous to the behavior of the agents. The first assumption is strongly 
supported by the evidence presented Udry (1990) that information concerning 
farming activities and outcomes flows freely within the village. The second 
assumption is more problematic, for while some events which enter the index 
are plausibly exogenous (e.g. animal invasions), others are not. The 
probability of lodging or flooding, for example, can be influenced by farming 
practices. However, if farming activities themselves are observable to the 
community, the moral hazard otherwise arising from the endogeneity of these 
events can be controlled. 
Unobservable Shocks to Income - The household's decision to default is 
affected by the realization of€ - the unobservable shock to household income 
for which there is no state-contingent adjustment in owed repayments. For 
these agricultural households, the most important element of€ is the 
accumulation of the myriad of tiny variations in the quality and timing of 
inputs that causes significant variation in yields from year to year. Seed 
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quality and the day-to-day timing of rainfall are examples of variables with 
significant random components that are important, at least according to these 
farmers, in the determination of yield. In order to measure the cumulative 
effect of variations in these inputs I use the value of per hectare yield on 
the household's upland and lowlands farms. These two variables compose the 
vector Z. Sample households could not provide information concerning the 
yields of non-sample households, so no measure of the unobservable shock to 
the partner household's income can be constructed. 
The use of this measure of€ depends upon the assumption that no 
contingent payments are made based on its components. This assumption will be 
justified if the components of Z are in fact unobservable to the village 
community. This is not a necessary condition, however. It is sufficient that 
no community standard (R5 ) calls for a contingent payment on the realization 
of an element of Z. The use of Zin this specification also depends on the 
assumption that its realization is econometrically exogenous to the credit 
market activities of the household. This assumption is more problematic; 
will return to it during the discussion of the results. 
Z may also be subject to important measurement error, as different 
farmers are likely to have systematically different methods for estimating 
their output. A better measure could be based on a 'difference of 
differences' variable which would use the difference between this year's yield 
(relative to the village average) and last year's yield (relative to last 
year's village average). However, this is as much a measure of last year's 
'unobservable' shock as it is of this year's, and thus would have to be 
included in the loan size and owed repayment equations as well as in the 
I 
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default equation, and thus could not provide an instrument to identify the 
default decision. 
Village effects (Xv) - Village dummy variables capture village-specific 
effects. There are differences in infrastructure, soil quality, and market 
access across the four villages which will affect the net supply of credit. 
The different villages will have been subject to different random production 
shocks in the previous cropping year and this will also affect the net supply 
of credit. These same factors will influence the negotiation over repayment. 
The village dummy variables act as predictors of income, and therefore must be 
included in the default equations for both the sample households and their 
partners. Also, the village dummy variables are likely to influence the 
default decision because of differences in the social environments of the 
different villages which affect the availability of information and 
enforcement mechanisms needed to support these credit transactions. 
Household Characteristics (Xh) - The wealth variable (WEALTH) is equal 
to the value of holdings of grain, trading stocks, livestock, and household 
goods (durable consumer goods such as radios, housewares, and farming 
implements) at the start of the survey. As discussed in section E, an 
increase in wealth is expected to increase the net supply of credit (or reduce 
the net demand for credit). In addition to increasing net lending, increased 
wealth also increases a household's disagreement payoff. Net repayments to 
the household, therefore, should increase with increased wealth. If the 
sample household owes a repayment, an increase in its wealth should reduce the 
likelihood that it will default (by increasing second period income). 
The SKILLS variable is a dummy variable indicating the presence of at 
least one household member with a special skill. Such skills include 
25 
carpentry, traditional medicine, tailoring, or being a religious teacher. 
This variable should act as a fixed asset, increasing the demand for working 
capital in order to use the skill, and thus decreasing the net lending of the 
household and worsening the terms at which loan transactions are made. Net 
repayments to the household should decrease in the presence of a skilled 
household member. SKILLS is included in the default equation for borrowers 
because of its effect on income. Higher skills should be correlated with 
higher income and therefore a lower likelihood of default. This correlation 
and its effect on default will tend to improve the terms at which the 
household borrows and makes the final effect of skills on owed repayments and 
net lending indeterminate when the household is a borrower. 
Land ownership is broken down into upland plots (UPLAND) and lowland 
plots (LOWLAND) because the different types of land require different levels 
of inputs. Lowlands require much more intensive inputs than do uplands 
(because the soil is heavier, and because farming can continue year-round). 
Land ownership should affect net lending, the owed repayment, and the default 
decision in much the same way as SKILLS. That is, increased land holdings 
should reduce net lending, worsen the terms at which loan transactions are 
made, and reduce the incidence of default. 
The age of the household head (AGE) should influence net lending and 
repayments in the same way as other fixed assets. 13 Older household heads 
should have lower net lending and the terms at which the household transacts 
loans should become worse. These results, however, were derived assuming that 
the probability of default was negligible. If older household heads are more 
13Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) propose plot-specific farming experience 
as one important route through which age could have an important affect. 
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able to utilize village mechanisms to enforce loans they have made, or are 
more subject to the discipline of village authorities when they borrow, then 
the affect of age on repayments becomes indeterminate. 
G. Model Specification. 
In this section I develop an econometric specification of loan 
transactions based on the model of the preceding sections. Each of the sample 
households is assumed to be engaged in a bilateral credit relationship. The 
empirical work below is characterized in terms of net lending by the sample 
household and net repayments to the sample household. 
The first order conditions of equation 4 implicitly define net-lending 
as a function of characteristics of the household and its partner: 
L=L(Xhh ,~artner). The comparative statics of "this equilibrium are complicated, 
but as noted above, the derivatives of the reduced form do not switch signs 
depending on net borrowing/lending status as long as the Nash solution is 
symmetric. Similarly, there is a reduced form for base repayments 
R=R(Xhh•~artner) · 
As noted above, the terms at which credit is transacted are implicit; 
the owed repayment is not observed. It must therefore be estimated from 
observed repayments. If we adopt the interpretation that any state-contingent 
adjustments in owed repayments are exogenously determined by community norms, 
R
then the amount owed in state s is OWED5 =R(Xhh,~artner) + R5 • OWED5 is observed 
5in those instances in which there is no default. is not observed, but is a 
function only of the observed states which is realized in the final period. 
Alternatively, if the state-contingent payments are negotiated by the two 
parties, then R5 =R5 (Xhh,~artner). In either case the contractual repayment R is 
independent of observable shocks, but depends upon a range of household 
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characteristics, while the state-contingent payment R5 depends on the 
realization of observable shocks. Rs and R therefore are identified though 
exclusion restrictions. It is poss.ible to test between our two hypotheses 
concerning the determination of the state-contingent payments. Evidence that 
household characteristics help predict these payments supports the notion that 
they are negotiated rather than determined by community norms. 
As described in section C, the default decision of the household (if it 
owes a repayment) depends on its realized final period income, the amount it 
owes, and the utility cost of defaulting. One component of the income of the 
household is the unobservable income shock E that it receives. The· 
contractual repayment R is independent of this unobservable income shock in 
the final period because it is set before the realization of€. Owed 
repayments are contingent upon the realization of the observable state of 
nature only, so Rs is also independent of€. The measure of this shock (Z) 
will therefore serve to identify the default decision of the household. An 
analogous measure of the unobservable income shock received by the partner 
would serve to identify its default decision. No such measure is available, 
however, so the amount defaulted by the partner is identified only though the 
non-linearity of the optimal default schedule. 
The reduced forms for both L(.) and R(.) include characteristics of both 
the household and its partner. During the fieldwork, attempts were made to 
collect information concerning the transaction partners, but they met with 
only minor success. Sample households in general refused to reveal the 
identity of their partners and would provide only limited information 
concerning them. The estimation that follows therefore is affected by omitted 
variables bias. 
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The system to be estimated is set forth below. Individual household 
subscripts are omitted. Equations (Sa) and (Sb) define net lending (Lis 
positive when a loan is made from a sample household to its partner). The 
friction represented by k1 is required by the possibility of transaction costs 
(introduced in eq. 4). An asterisk indicates that a variable is latent. 
(borrowing) 
(lending) 
Equation 6 defines the net repayments owed to sample households (OWED* 
is positive for a repayment to a sample household from its partner). 
if 1#0 
6. OWED * 
[ 0 if L=O. 
Recall that Yh and YP consist of the indicators of the observable shocks 
to the incomes of the household and the partner. Together, they define the 
observable state on natures, which in turn determines the stat-contingent 
payment R5 Yh and YP identify any state-contingent payments contained within• 
the loan repayments. Indicators of observable shocks received by both the 
household and its partner are included in the estimation of the repayment 
equation because the state-contingent payments may depend on the shocks 
received by both parties. The central hypothesis tested below is that the 
state-contingent payments serve to pool risk between the household and its 
partner by flowing toward the party which has received a particularly adverse 
observable shock. 
Equations 7a and 7b describe a sample household's default decision. 
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7. if the household is a borrower: 
a. D* Xv10 + ~11 + Yh12 + Z13 + 140WED* + 113 
0 and D = 1 if D.* > 0 
b. [REP 
REP OWED* and D - 0 if D* ~ 0. 
The default decision depends upon the household's income and the amount owed, 
given the cost of a default. Village dummy variables Xv are included to 
capture the effect of village residence on both income and the (community 
determined) cost of a default. Household specific variables Xh are included 
as predictors of income. For the same reason the indices of observable (Yh) 
and unobservable (Z) shocks to the household's income are included. 
Equations 8a and 8b describe a partner's default decision. 
8. if the sample household is a lender: 
a. D* XvAO + YpAl + A 0WED* + 1142 
0 and D = 1 if D* > 0 
b. [REP 
REP OWED* and D = 0 if D* ~ 0. 
Village dummy variables are again included because of their effect on both the 
partner household's income and the cost of a default. Equations 7 and 8 
should be identical, but no household characteristics of the partner are 
available. The only available household level indicator of the partner's 
income is Yp, the index of observable adverse shocks affecting the partner 
household. I have no measure of farm yields for non-sample households, so no 
measure of the unobservable income shock received by the partner household can 
be constructed. 
The random variables 11 1 , 112 , 11 3 and 114 are assumed to be jointly normally 
distributed with zero mean and covariance matrix~- The parameters of the 
default decisions (eqs. 7-8) are identified only up to scale, so the variances 
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of v3 and v4 are set to unity. The contribution of each observation to the 
likelihood function can be found in the appendix. 
As noted above, L*, OWED*, and D* are latent variables, while L, I, REP, 
and Dare observed. The covariance between and v4 cannot be identified atv3 
all, as it has no effect on observed outcomes. The Rosett-type friction of 
equation 5 is identified through its non-linearity; no variables are available 
to identify the friction independently of the determinants of loan size. 
Equation 7 is identified by the vector Z, which affects the amount defaulted 
but not the repayment owed. Equation 8 is identified only through its non­
linear structure, as I have no measure pf the yields achieved on the-partners' 
plots. 
The assumption that the idiosyncratic shocks (both Y and Z) are serially 
uncorrelated is critical. However, as long as the deviation of the household 
level shock from the village shock is not serially correlated, the estimates 
are consistent. Net lending L* is affected by last year's idiosyncratic 
shocks (Yt-i and Zt-i). This dependence is captured in the random variable vi. 
If the idiosyncratic shocks are serially correlated, then Vi is correlated 
with Yh, YP and Zand the estimates are inconsistent. Serial correlation in 
shocks that affect the entire village are not problematic, as they are 
reflected in the coefficients of the village dummy variables. 
H. Estimation Results. 
I present FIML estimates of the base specification in table 3, and some 
variations on this base model in tables 4-5. Each variation is a 
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generalization of the base model, so that nested tests of the significance of 
each generalization can be made. 14 
State-contingent payments - The results presented in section B of table 
3 indicate that observable shocks received by sample households after a loan 
is extended improve the terms at which the loan is repaid. Observable shocks 
received by a household's partner worsen the terms faced by the sample 
household. The point estimates imply that a one standard deviation adverse 
shock to the household's lowland plots is associated with a N61 contingent 
payment to the household (the average amount lent is N191, or about $40). A 
one standard deviation adverse shock received by the household's partner leads 
to a N29 contingent payment by the household to its partner. The point 
estimate of the impact of observable shocks ~n the household's upland plots 
indicates that the household receives only a NS contingent payment for a one 
standard deviation shock, and the coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero. The results confirm the hypothesis that owed repayments are state­
contingent, and that this flexibility allows for direct risk pooling between 
borrowers and lenders. 15 
The finding that state-contingent payments are made in response to the 
realization of observable shocks on lowlands plots, but not on upland plots 
(the data on shocks realized by transaction partners do not differentiate 
between uplands and lowlands) is not untenable, as lowland and upland land 
14The tables are based on specifications which gain efficiency by 
imposing the restriction that the covariances a 13 , a 14 , a23 and a24 are zero. 
The likelihood ratio test of the joint restriction that these covariances are 
zero yields a x2 (4) test statistic of .6, which is insignificantly different 
from zero. Moreover, no coefficient changes sign in the unrestricted 
specification, nor is there any statistically significant change in any 
estimate. 
15This confirms the central findings of Udry (1990) and Udry (1991). 
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historically have been treated differently in a number of respects, from land 
tenure to farming practices. 16 Furthermore, upland plots are dispersed 
throughout the land surrounding the· village, while lowland plots are 
concentrated on the banks of the few streams near each village. Therefore it 
is easier to monitor events on transaction partners' lowland plots than on 
their upland plots. 
In order to test the hypothesis that the state-contingent payments are 
negotiated rather than set by community norms, the model was estimated with 
interactions between the indicators of observable shocks and various household 
characteristics. Three different specifications were estimated. First, 
interactions were allowed between adverse shocks on the different types of 
land and the area owned of each type of land. The likelihood ratio test of 
the restriction that the interaction coefficients are zero yields a x2 (4) test 
statistic of 3.4, which is not significantly different from zero at the 5 
percent level. There is no evidence, therefore, that the payment which is 
contingent upon receipt of a particular adverse observable shock varies 
according to the size of the plot affected by the shock. Second, I added 
interactions between the village dummy variables and the indicators of adverse 
observable shocks. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that these 
interaction coefficients are zero yields a x2 (6) test statistic of 7.0, which 
is not significantly different from zero. The size of the state-contingent 
payments does not seem to vary across the four villages. Finally, I permitted 
interactions between all the household characteristics (Xh) and the indicators 
of observable shocks. The x2 (10) likelihood ratio test statistic of the 
restriction that these interactions are zero is 10.4, which again is not 
16See Norman (1972), Hill (1977) and Ega (1984). 
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significantly different from zero. There is no evidence, therefore, that the 
state-contingent payments depend on the characteristics of the household. 
This series of tests provides no support for the hypothesis that households 
negotiate over the state-contingent payments which are embedded in these loan 
transactions. Rather, there seem to be community standards that prescribe 
appropriate payments contingent on the realization of particular observable 
shocks. 17 
Table 4 reports the results of a specification which permits the 
coefficients of the indices of observable adverse events to vary according to 
the sample household's net borrower/net lender status. The results in section 
B show that when adverse shocks are received by sample households who are net 
borrowers, they pay back less. Similarly, when the sample household is the 
lender, an adverse shock received by its transaction partner is associated 
with lower repayments to the household. These results could be consistent 
with conventional models of loan contracting, as the lower repayments might 
simply reflect a higher incidence of default on the part of borrowers who 
receive adverse shocks. Here, however, the results control for the default 
status of the borrower. Owed repayments, therefore, depend on the realization 
of adverse shocks by the borrower. This finding is consistent with a notion 
of a loan as an equity investment in the borrower's enterprise, an appropriate 
form of lending under Shari'a law. 
17Community norms which dictate risk sharing between households are an 
oft-cited element of the 'moral economy' or 'subsistence ethic' which has been 
hypothesized to provide a measure of security in peasant communities in risky
environments (Scott [1976]; Watts [1983]). The present model may be 
interpreted as an effort to place an analysis of rural credit based on 
household optimizing behavior within the context of a village moral economy. 
34 
Even more striking, however, are the results in section B of table 4 
which indicate that when adverse shocks are received by lenders, they are paid 
back more. When the sample household is the lender, adverse shocks on its 
lowland plots are associated with higher repayments to the household. 
Similarly, when the sample household is the borrower, adverse shocks affecting 
its transaction partner are associated with higher repayments by the sample 
household. In fact, there is no statistically significant difference between 
the responses of repayments to adverse shocks received by net lenders and net 
borrowers. A likelihood ratio test of the restriction that the coefficients 
of the indices of adverse shocks are the same for net lenders and net 
borrowers yields a x2 (3) test statistic of 0.4, which is not significantly 
different from zero at the 10 percent level. This provides no evidence, 
therefore, against the hypothesis of symmetric Nash equilibrium; borrowers and 
lenders appear to be treated symmetrically. 
Household characteristics - Turn now to the other results from the base 
specification. The net lending equation reported in section A of table 3 
confirms the hypothesis of transaction costs in lending. The friction 
coefficient is significantly different from zero. As expected, households 
with higher levels of wealth holdings at the start of the sample year have 
higher net lending. The effect of wealth on repayments, however, is 
insignificant. 
Ownership of upland and lowland land affect net lending in opposite 
directions. Households with larger holdings of upland plots tend to lend 
more, while households with larger holdings of lowlands borrow more (though 
this latter coefficient is only marginally significant). This may reflect the 
higher working capital requirements of lowlands plots. 
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Households containing at least one family member with a special skill 
borrow, on average, N63 more than other households. This result is in 
accordance with the expectation that extra working capital would be required 
to employ these skills. Similarly, households with older household heads have 
significantly less net lending than those headed by younger men. In another 
specification (not reported), I included measures of the household head's 
formal education (both western and Islamic). Neither measure had any 
significant effect on the household's behavior in the credit market and a test 
of the joint significance of the education variables yields a x2 (4) test 
statistic of only 2.4. These findings are in accordance with the hypothesis 
advanced by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1989) that farming experience rather than 
formal education is an important determinant of farming ability in risky but 
stationary environments. 
The estimates of the default equation for the household and its partner 
are presented in section C of table 3. As expected, after controlling for 
observable adverse events, households which received lower yields are more 
likely to default. Also in accordance with theoretical expectations, 
households which owed higher repayments were more likely to default. In order 
to explore the consequences of omitted variables in the partner's default 
equation, section C of table 5 presents estimates from a specification which 
permitted the effects of owed repayments on the default decision to vary 
between sample households and their partners. There is no significant 
difference between the two coefficients. 
A household's wealth has no significant effect on the default decision. 
Households with larger land holdings are significantly more likely to default, 
contrary to theoretical expectation. An observable shock on its land reduces 
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the probability of default by the household. This is a puzzling result 
because the theoretical model implies that a reduction in income should 
increase the probability of default". It is possible that after an adjustment 
in owed repayments has been made in response to receipt of a shock, the cost 
of defaulting increases. It is interesting, however, that observable shocks 
affecting the household's partner increase the probability of default by the 
partner, though the coefficient is only marginally significant. 
The village dummy variables play an important role in each equation. 
They capture a variety of different collinear effects including village level 
shocks, infrastructure, and the socially-determined costs of default. 
I. Conclusions. 
One of the primary motivations for borrowing in agricultural societies 
is to stabilize consumption in the face of fluctuating incomes. Households 
borrow more when they suffer an adverse shock and they lend more when they are 
favored with a positive shock. Credit transactions in rural northern Nigeria 
play a more direct role in pooling risk between households. Repayments owed 
on a loan depend upon the realization of random production and consumption 
shocks by both borrower and lender. The restriction of loan transactions to 
agents within a small social space allows the free flow of information between 
borrower and lender that is necessary to support state-contingent contracting 
and provides access to community-based mechanisms to monitor and enforce the 
contracts. The results of this paper confirm that state-contingent payments 
which flow to the recipients of adverse shocks are embedded within loan 
repayments. 
The estimation carried out in this paper is based on a bilateral model 
of loan contracting. This model admits a wide range of assumptions concerning 
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the flow of information within the village. It also permits an investigation 
of the decision by a household to default on its repayment obligations. Most 
importantly, this approach captures· at least a portion of the rich social and 
institutional context within which the loans are transacted. 
Nevertheless, the weaknesses of this approach must be acknowledged. 
Some are technical, and have been detailed in the body of the paper. These 
include the drought of information concerning the transaction partners of 
sample households; the difficulty of determining whether or not a default has 
occurred; and the assumptions that are required to identify the default 
decisions of the transaction partners of the sample households. Other 
weaknesses are necessary consequences of the approach taken. By focusing 
attention on the loan transaction itself, the properties of the general 
equilibrium are lost. More generally, the two primary actors in the model 
interact within the rules set by the small community in which they reside, but 
they make no contribution to any changes which occur in that community. 
have treated the community as autonomous, setting norms of behavior and 
providing neutral monitoring and enforcing authority. This has enabled me to 
analyze the behavior of optimizing agents within the context of their 
community, but provides no mechanism for exploring the community itself. This 
work, therefore, invites extensions which .move away from this partial 
equilibrium method. Most simply, the Nash bargaining game could be 
generalized to allow for community-wide rather than bilateral equilibrium. 
More ambitious research would focus on changes in the community norms and 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms which set the context for these state­
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APPENDIX: THE DEFAULT DECISION 
Consider a given state of natures. Let z = Y5 +~ and OWED= R+R5 The• 
partner will default if the benefit· from defaulting U(z)-C(OWED) -U(z-OWED)>O. 
Recall that U() is continuous and that the limit as x➔o+ of C(x)=k>O. 
Therefore, the limit as OWEO➔ O+ of U(z)-C(OWED)-U(z-OWED) = -k<O. For a small 
enough amount owed, the partner will not default. Because the limit as x➔o+ 
of U(x) ➔ -ro and C(x) is bounded from above the limit as OWEO➔ z- of 
U(z)-C(OWED)-(z-OWED) ➔ ro. U() and C() are continuous, so there exists some 
OWED* such that U(z)-C(OWED*)-U(z-OWED*)=O. Because B(OWED)=U(z)-C(OWED)-U(z­
OWED) is strictly convex and the limit as OWEO➔ O+ < 0, OWED* is unique (see 
figure Al). 
·k 
Now consider a given level of OWED=R+R5 >0. Define 
B(z)=U(z)-C(OWED)-u(z-OWED). The limit as z ➔OWED+ of B(z) ➔ ro Because U() 
increasing, concave and bounded from above, the limit as z➔ro of B(z) 
=C(OWED)<O. Therefore, there is some z0 such that B(z 0 )=0. 8B/8z<O, so z0 is 
unique. z 0 (0WED) is a continuous and continuously differentiable function 
implicitly defined by B(z 0 (0WED))-O. From the implicit function formula, 
~zC = _ u'(z"-OWED) -C1 (0WED) > O 
~OWED u'(z") -u'(z"-OWED) 
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because the denominator is negative and the numerator is positive when 
B(z)=O. zc is implicitly defined as a differentiable function of OWED for all 
OWED>O, with zc'(OWED)>O. Define ~c(OWED) = zc(OWED) - Y. Note that as 
OWEl}+O+, zc(OWED) ➔O and ~c(OWED) ➔ -Y. 
The critical value of random income ~c(OWED) is now defined. Note 
however that ~c is not defined for OWED<O, for in such situations the partner 
never defaults. In order to avoid technical difficulties is describing the 
equilibrium in section E, it is useful to define an arbitrary continuation of 
the function ~c(OWED) for values of OWED less than zero which is continuous 
and differentiable for all values of OWED. I have dropped all state 
superscripts to avoid notational clutter during this discussion. But the 
critical value of random income obviously varies across states of nature. 
Therefore, for each states, define ~5 (OWED5 ) as equal to the function 
~c(OWED) as discussed above for this state for all OWED5 >O, and equal to any 
arbitrary differentiable continuation of this function for OWED5 ~O. 
APPENDIX: THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION 
There are five observationally distinct cases, depending upon the 
borrowing/lending and default status of each household. I have dropped the i 
subscripts; each equation refers to an individual observation. The contribution of 
each observation to the likelihood function is as follows: 
Case 1: L < 0, the household is a net borrower: 
Al. = L - Xav1 
Subcase (a): D = 0: 
A2. and v = REP - xp - Yp
2 0 1 
A3. and fl= v3+14v2< -[Xv10+ ~11+ Yh12 + Z13 + 14 (xp0+Yp1)]. 
Subcase (b): D = 1, REP= 0: 
A4. and fl~ -[X10+ X11 + Yh12 + Z13 + 14 (xp0+ Yp1)]. 
. 2 d 2 d .If v and v have mean zero, variances a an a an covariance
2 3 2 3 
2 2 2 2 
, th;n af = a3 +(14 ) ·a2a23 
a2f= 14a2 + a23· 
Case 2: L > 0, the household is a net lender: 
AS. = L + kL - Xav1 
Subcase (a): D = 0: 
A6. and 
A7. and f2 = v4+AV2 < -[XvAO+ YpAl + A2(XPo+ YP1)l 
Subcase (b): D = 1, REP= 0: 
AB. and ~ -[XvAO + YpAl + A2 (xp0+ Yp1)]f 2 
The covariance matrix of f and ~ is defined similarly to that of fl and ~1 .2 2 
Case 3: L = 0 ,the household neither borrows nor lends): 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 




monthly rate of 
return 
simple rate of 
return 
repayment 
period in days 
(A) Borrower 
-no shock 0.5% 20.4% 67 
-shock -4.0% -0.6% 72 
Impact of shock 
on mean: lower lower longer 
(t) (1. 58) (2.20) (1.03) 
(B) Lender 
-no shock -7.5% -5.0% 89 
-shock 2.6% 11.8% 80 
Impact of shock 
on mean: higher higher shorter 
(t) (4.56) (3.06) (1. 89) 
The impact of the shocks is judged by a two-sided t-test of equal means (~oshock­
µshock). The absolute value of the t-statistic is in parentheses. 
The measure of 'adverse shock' is: 
1. A respondent (borrower or lender) is judged to have received an adverse 
shock if he reported an unexpected adverse event on any of the fields he farms during
the term of the loan. Common events were flooding, wind damage, or infestation by
insects. 
2. The other party (borrower or lender) is judged to have received an adverse 
shock if the respondent reported an unexpected, serious event that occurred in the 
other household during the term of the loan. Common events were farming events as in 
(1), and medical problems, rain damage to houses, and other 'household emergencies.' 
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Table 2: Variables Used 
A. Dependent Variables 
NET LENDING : net amount lent (x NlOO)* 
REPAYMENT: net amount repaid (xNlOO) · 
(to sampie household by others) 
DEFAULT: indicator of default on loan 







value of livestock, household articles, 
grain and trading stocks evaluated at the 
start of the survey (xlOOO). 
age in years of household head. 
dummy variable. 1 if family of household 
head has been in village 2 or more 
generations. 
dummy variable. 1 if at least one member 
of household has special skills. 
gona (upland) land owned in hectares. 
fadama (lowland) land owned in hectares. 
C. Indicators of Observable Shocks to Household Income (Yb) 
UPROBLEM: index of self-reported problems 
on upland farms. 
LPROBLEM index of self-reported problems 
on lowland farms. 
D. Indicator of Observable Shocks to Partner Income (Yp) 
PARTPROB : proportion of loans with partners who 
received adverse shocks 
E. Indicators of Unobservable Shocks to Household Income 
UYIELD log of per-hectare yield on upland farms 
LYIELD log of per-hectare yield on lowland farms 
Mean 















*The Nigerian currency is the Naira. The exchange rate ranged from $1 = N4 in 
February 1988 to $1 = N7 in February 1989. 
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Table 3: Bilateral Model FIML Estimates 
A. Net Lending Equation (positive -lending from the household to the partner): 
Variable Parameter 
CONSTANT 5.885 26.32 
VILI.AGEl -2.304 -10.44 
VILI.AGE2 -3.029 -13. 77 
VILI.AGE3 -1.373 -6.22 
WEALTH 0.138 2.10 
AGE -0.070 -3.76 
SKILLS -0.629 -3.14 
UPLAND 0.405 3.67 
LOWLAND -0. 372 -1. 86 
FRICTION CUTOFF: 
4.499 21. 39 
a 7.944 41. 75 






































Table 3: Bilateral Model FIML Estimates (Continued) 
C. Default Equation: 
Variable Parameter· T-Ratio 
CONSTANT 
- sample households 0.745 3.33 
- transaction partner -4.488 2.03 
VILLAGEl -1.123 -5.13 
VILLAGE2 -0.025 -0.11 
VILLAGE3 -1.014 -4.50 
WEALTH 0.018 0.24 
GONA 0. 776 8.20 
FADAMA 0.770 3.41 
INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS: 
ON UPLANDS -4.787 -2.14 
ON LOWLANDS -8.011 -3.59 
LOAN PARTNER 2.124 0.94 
FARM YIELD: 
ON UPLANDS -3.153 -1.40 
ON LOWLANDS -8. 778 -3.95 
AMOUNT OWED 5.782 28.12 
-LN(Likelihood) = 1209.0 
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Table 4: Testing the Responsiveness of Contract Terms to Shocks: 
Sample Households vs. Partner Households 
A. Net Lending Equation (positive -lending from the household to the partner): 
Variable Parameter T-Ratio 
CONSTANT 5.884 26.31 
VILLAGEl -2.304 -10.44 
VILLAGE2 -3.030 -13. 77 
VILLAGE3 -1.375 -6.23 
WEALTH 0.138 2.10 
AGE -0.070 -3.76 
SKILLS -0.630 -3.14 
UPLAND 0.405 3.67 
LOWLAND -0.373 -1. 86 
FRICTION CUTOFF: 
4.492 21. 36 
a 7.942 41. 74 
B. Net Repayment Equation (positive-repayments from partner to the household): 
Variable Parameter T-Ratio 
CONSTANT 2.005 9.01 
VILLAGEl 0.765 3.51 
VILLAGE2 -1.831 -8.43 
VILLAGE3 -1.173 -5.36 
WEALTH 0.083 1. 24 
AGE -0.026 -1. 59 
SKILLS -1.097 -5.78 
UPLAND 0.259 2.83 
LOWLAND -0.251 -1.34 
INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS: 
Borrowing Households Lending Households 
ON UPLANDS 0.221 1.00 0.071 0.31 
ON LOWLANDS 2.273 10.21 2.000 8.83 
LOAN PARTNER -1. 408 -6.37 -1.112 -4.91 
a 7.947 41. 75 
rhol2 0.760 19.14 
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Table 4: Sample Households vs. Partner Households (Continued) 
C. Default Equation: 
Variable Parameter· T-Ratio 
CONSTANT 
- sample households -2.209 -9.86 
- transaction partner -8.030 -3.69 
VILI.AGEl -0.083 -0.37 
VILI.AGE2 -0.025 -0.11 
VILI.AGE3 -1. 451 -6.43 
WEALTH 0.388 4.39 
GONA 1. 291 12.12 
FADAMA 0.873 3.86 
INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS: 
ON UPLANDS -5.900 -2.63 
ON LOWLANDS -13.060 -5.83 
LOAN PARTNER 8.335 3.69 
FARM YIELD: 
ON UPLANDS -10.536 -4.66 
ON LOWLANDS -14.358 -6.42 
AMOUNT OWED 8.611 40.67 
-LN(Likelihood) = 1208.9 
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Table 5: Generalized Default Equation 
































































Table 5: Generalized Default Equation (Continued) 
C. Default Equation: 
Variable Parameter T-Ratio 
CONSTANT 
- sample households 0.484 2.23 
- transaction partner -4.320 -1. 97 
VILIAGEl -1. 506 -6.74 
VILIAGE2 -0.247 -1.09 
VILIAGE3 -1.298 -5.73 
WEALTH 0.021 0.94 
GONA 0.745 3.35 
FADAMA 0.122 0.53 
INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS: 
ON UPIANDS -4.932 -2.23 
ON LOWIANDS -8.252 -3. 71 
LOAN PARTNER 1.789 0.79 
FARM YIELD: 
ON UPIANDS -3.040 -1. 35 
ON LOWIANDS -8.929 -4.02 
AMOUNT OWED 
- Sample Households 5.761 27.82 
- Partner Households 5.962 26. 71 
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